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An optimal program of distortionary taxes, money growth, and borrowing to finance a 
stream of expenditures is computed in a monetary real business cycle model for which 
distribution issues between the rich and poor play a fundamental role in policy decisions. 
Specifically, a simple feedback rule links public spending on goods and services to a 
measure of income inequality, and the government is required to provide poor households 
with some minimum level of transfers.  The stationary equilibrium policy displays positive 
capital taxation, progressive labor taxes, and moderate (6 percent) inflation.  The capital 
tax and the inflation tax fluctuate over time to absorb budget shocks, while the labor tax 
remains relatively constant. Model simulations compare favorably in many respects with 
postwar U.S. time series on tax rates, money growth, and aggregate business cycle 
variables. The solution method employs the recursive algorithm developed by Kydland 
and Prescott (1980) to compute optimal policy rules under the assumption of 
commitment. 
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Regardless  of  one's  views  on  whether government should  be  involved in  the  business  of 
redistributing income, it seems clear that  the complicated U.S.  system of  taxes and public spending 
programs has been designed, in large measure, with this objective in mind. Policy debates are often 
driven by  arguments for a more equitable distribution of income, as in this example: 
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell insisted from  the  beginning that  the 
wealthiest  taxpayers  pick  up  more  of  the  tab ...  Now,  the  nearly  instant 
availability of the distribution tables casts every offer and counter-offer in terms 
of fairness between  the  rich  and  the poor. Every  plan  involving a cut in  the 
capital gains tax  invariably showed a windfall for the rich.' 
The distribution of  wealth and income in the United States is highly skewed, with the top 20 
percent of  households owning about 80 percent of the wealth and earning about 42 percent of  pre-tax 
income.'  In this environment, policymakers and the public have come to view the capital gains tax as 
being paid primarily by the wealthy. This tax and another capital-type tax, the corporate income tax, are 
frequently singled out by  policymakers as tools for achieving more equity in the U.S.  economy. The 
government has also developed other redistributive tools, including our system of progressive marginal 
tax rates and a myriad of means-tested assistance programs, commonly known as  elfar are."^ 
In  this  paper,  I  formulate  a  model  of  dynamic  optimal  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  that 
incorporates, in  a  simple  way,  the  government's  use  of  redistributive  tools .like the  capital  tax, 
progressive labor taxation, and  means-tested transfers. I then subject the model to the same kind  of 
quantitative comparisons with U.S. data that have been widely used in the real business cycle literature. 
As a way of approximating the skewed distribution of U.S.  wealth and income, capital ownership in the 
'see  A.  Murray and  J.  Calrnes, "How the Democrats, with  Rare Cunning, Won  the Budget War," The Wall Breet Journal, 
November 15,  1990. 
'see  McDermed, Clark, and Men (1989), figures 13.1 and  13.2, and Rosen (1992), table 8.1. The measure of wealth inequality 
cited here is based on net worth from 1983 household survey data. This measure remained approximately constant from 1962 to 1983. 
3~he  principal means-tested transfer programs used to supplement the earnings of the poor are Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). There are also in-kind transfer 
programs such as housing assistance, food stamps, job training, and Medicaid. Social insurance programs may  be viewed as implicit 
transfer programs. The three major social insurance programs are Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance. For more 
details, see Economic Report  of the President 1992, chapter 4. 
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a dynamic version of  the Ramsey  (1927)  optimal tax  problem,  in which  a  policymaker chooses a 
program of distortionary taxes over time to finance a required stream of  spending. Monetary policy is 
incorporated by  viewing inflation as an effective tax on real money balances. 
A crucial aspect of  the model is the manner in which government outlays are determined. In 
particular, I assume that  a  simple feedback  rule links  public spending on  goods and  services to a 
measure  of  income inequality and, further, that  the  government must  provide  the  poor  with  some 
minimum level of  transfers. The transfer payments are a proxy for the various means-tested assistance 
programs in the U.S.  economy. However, the infinite-horizon framework abstracts from any life-cycle 
effects of specific transfer programs, like Social Security. The endogenous policy variables are the tax 
rate on capital income, tax rates on labor income (for the rich and poor), and the growth rate of  the 
nominal money stock. For simplicity, the steady-state level of govemment debt is taken to be exogenous. 
The government's problem is solved using a numerical recursive algorithm based on a method developed 
by  Kydland and Prescott (1980). Specifically, a "pseudo state variable" is defined that permits the use 
of dynamic programming to compute optimal policy rules under the assumption of commitment. 
A primary finding is that equilibrium policy displays positive capital taxation, progressive labor 
taxes (in the sense that the rich are taxed at a higher marginal rate than the poor), and moderate (6 
percent) inflation. In  simulations, the capital tax  and the inflation tax  fluctuate over time to absorb 
budget shocks, while the labor tax remains relatively constant. As previously identified by Judd (1989) 
and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991)- the fact that household savings in the form of capital or money 
balances is inelastic in the short run  suggests that state-contingent taxes on these assets can serve as 
nondistortionary shock absorbers. Budget shocks in the model are caused by  changes in the size of the 
tax  base  (due to  business  cycle  fluctuations) or  by  changes in exogenous  spending requirements. 
Predictions for the  moments of  aggregate economic variables are  very  close to those  of  previous 
monetary real business cycle models. This result is reassuring because it suggests that these models can 
be extended into new areas without sacrificing a reasonable description of  the aggregate economy. 
Another finding is that some predictions of partial-equilibrium models that have been used in 
the past as empirical tests for optimal government behavior are not implied by this general-equilibrium 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmmodel. In simulations, the labor tax is negatively correlated with inflation (or money growth) while the 
capital tax is positively correlated with inflation. Partial-equilibrium models generally do not distinguish 
between labor and capital taxes and predict a positive correlation between an "income tax" and inflation. 
This failure to  distinguish between factor incomes may  help  to  explain the inconsistent findings of 
previous empirical studies designed to test the partial-equilibrium result (see Mankiw [1987], Roubini 
and Sachs [1989], Poterba and Rotemberg [1990], and Roubini [1991]). 
Within the infinite-horizon growth framework, models of dynamic optimal fiscal policy have 
been applied to the study of heterogeneous-agent economies by Judd (1985), Aiyagari and Peled (199 I), 
and Alesina and Rodrik (1991). This paper attempts to go further by bringing in monetary policy and 
by directly examining the quantitative implications of the model in comparison to U.S.  data." A well- 
known result that applies to infinite-horizon growth models is that the optimal steady-state tax on capital 
is zero.'  Moreover, Judd (1985) has shown that this result holds regardless of the weights placed on 
different groups in a social welfare function, even when one group holds the entire stock of  physical 
capital. This seemingly counterintuitive finding obtains because a zero tax  on capital leads to higher 
levels of capital accumulation and hence higher wages, thus benefiting all individuals, not just capital 
owners. However, variations in the structure of the standard model can overturn the optirnality of  a zero 
tax rate on capital, for example, when certain kinds of externalities or constraints are present or when 
the government faces restrictions on the menu of available policy instruments. Arrow and Kun  (1970), 
Thompson (1979), Stiglitz (1987), Aiyagari and Peled (1991), and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1992) 
all provide examples of such cases. 
~  In this paper, I assume that income inequality generates negative externalities that ultimately lead 
I 
to a drain on productive resources in the form of higher public spending needs. The government's desire 
4~tatic  models of  optimal redistributive taxation can  be found in  Fair (1971), Mirlees (1971), and Stiglitz (1987). A dynamic 
model with  futed saving propensities is developed by  Pestieau and Possen (1978). The overlapping-generations  models of Atkinson 
and Sandmo (1980) and Stiglitz (1987) examine aspects of intergenerational  redistribution. This paper deals with redistribution among 
rich  and poor households of  the same generation. The assumption of  an operative bequest motive among finitely lived households 
allows the economy to  be  modeled using an  infinite-horizon framework. 
 he  intuition for this result is that the long-run supply elasticity of capital is essentially infmite. Recall that the Ramsey principle 
of optimal taxation states that taxes should be set in  inverse proporlion to the elasticity of  the tax base. The zero tax result is discussed 
by  Arrow and  Kun. (1970), pp.  195-203, and  has been further elabomted on  by  Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986). 
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formulation in which feedback from the economy affects government spending policy introduces a role 
for the  capital tax in reducing income inequality. Support for this idea can be  found  in  the  urban 
development literature, where studies of urban decline often refer to the spillover effects of distributional 
inequality,  such  as  increased  crime,  family  disintegration,  urban  population  loss,  deteriorating 
neighborhoods, and low-quality  school^.^ In addition to other harmful consequences, these spillovers 
contribute to a drop in income and property tax bases in urban areas, forcing cities to rely increasingly 
on aid from federal and state governments to provide basic public ser~ices.~  On the empirical side, some 
recent cross-country studies suggest that government spending and economic growth are both linked to 
inequality. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) report a statistically significant, positive correlation between 
income inequality and public spending on education, transportation, and communication, while Persson 
and Tabellini (1991), Alesina and Rodrik (1991), and Perotti (1992) find that income inequality has a 
detrimental effect on economic growth. All of  these studies are consistent with a model of political 
equilibrium in  which  an  increase in inequality causes the median voter to support higher levels of 
government redistribution expenditures and higher taxes on capital. 
In an economy with distortionary taxes, the optimal rate of inflation can depend crucially on the 
specific structure of the model. A common result is that the optimal rate of inflation is negative in steady 
state, in agreement with the Friedrnan (1969) optimal money rule. Under this policy, the government 
reduces the size of  the nominal money stock at the rate of  time preference, thereby achieving a zero 
nominal interest rate. However, the presence of externalities or the use of  alternative functional forms 
(for household utility or transaction cost functions) can yield optimal rates of inflation that are po~itive.~ 
Here, I assume  that  the government is  constrained  to provide  poor households with  some 
minimum level of transfers. This constraint can be viewed as a way of reflecting that welfare programs 
represent a "safety net" for the poor that cannot be reduced below some baseline amount. Alternatively, 
'see,  for example, Bateman and  Hochman (1971), Bradbury, Downs, and Small (1982), and  Mieszkowski and  Mills (1993). 
7~rom  1950 to  1988, federal and state aid to cities averaged nearly 40 percent of local revenues. See Rosen (1992), table 21.4. 
'see  Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991), Braun  (1993), and Croushore (1993) for further discussion. 
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of the constraint is to introduce an externality into the government's decision problem that can motivate 
the use of  a positive inflation tax.  Since transfer payments are not  taxed  but  must  be  financed  by 
distorting taxes, it is efficient for the government to spread the distortionary costs across various tax 
bases, including consumption. The inflation tax  operates as a consumption tax in this model because a 
subset of consumption goods (known as "cash goods") can only be acquired with previously accumulated 
cash balances.  A steady-state annual inflation rate of  6 percent is obtained when model transfers are 
calibrated to match the average level of U.S. means-tested transfers (approximately 2 percent of GNP). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the model and the 
recursive solution method.  Section 4 describes the  choice  of  parameter values.  Section 5 presents 
quantitative results from steady-state and dynamic experiments, and section 6 concludes. 
2.  The Model 
The model economy consists of two types of infinitely lived households, identical competitive 
firms, and the government. The total number of  households is normalized  to one so that y and  1-y 
represent the fraction of  poor and rich  households, respectively, where O< y <l. The poor's  discount 
'factor (pP) is assumed to  be  less than  that  of  the  rich  (pR).  This implies  that  the poor  are more 
impatient than the rich and thus would rather borrow than save at the steady-state real interest rate.9 In 
equilibrium, ownership of the capital stock is concentrated in the hands of the rich. Although the poor 
would like to borrow to increase their current consumption, it is assumed that they are prevented from 
doing so. A rationale for the borrowing constraints is that the rich are unwilling to make loans to the 
poor because of  difficulties in enforcing  repayment. The condition pP<pR  ensures that the poor will 
choose not to save for stochastic equilibria of  the type examined here, involving sufficiently small 
fluctuations around the steady state.10p11  The assumption regarding discount factors is consistent with 
 he discount factor fl is inversely related to the marginal rate of time preference p, according to P=(l+p)-'. 
''In  a perfect foresight model, Baker (1980) shows that concentrated ownership of capital results when one household type is 
more patient than  other types. Woodford (1988) applies this result to  a stochastic economy. When  all  households have the same 
discount factor, Baker shows that the steady-state distribution of capital across households is  indeterminate, i.e.. long-run equilibrium 
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to be more impatient (see Lawrance [1987, 19911). Further distinction between households is made by 
assuming that the labor input of the poor is less productive than that of  the rich, based on the idea that 
the poor have less human capital, perhaps due to less education. Rather than explicitly modeling the 
accumulation of  human capital, I introduce an exogenous labor efficiency parameter (&)  for the poor. 
This factor represents the ratio of  the poor's  productive labor input to their number of  hours worked, 
where O<  & <I. In equilibrium, this factor produces a wage differential between the rich and poor. 
2.1  The Household's Problem 
Household behavior is described in the context of  a "cash-in-advance" economy similar to that 
of Cooley and Hansen (1992). Household income is either allocated to consumption, held in the form 
of money, or, in the case of rich households, invested in the formation of  productive capital. To ensure 
that money is held in equilibrium, households are assumed to be subject to a cash-in-advance constraint 
of the type described by Lucas and Stokey (1983, 1987). A particular type of consumption goods known 
as cash goods can only be acquired with previously accumulated cash balances. Purchases of the other 
type,  known  as  credit  goods,  can  be  financed  out  of  current  income.  Household  preferences are 
summarized by  the following utility function: 
Superscripts P and R are used throughout the discussion to denote quantities held by poor and 
rich households, respectively. In  (I), c,,'  represents purchases of cash goods and c,'  is purchases of 
credit goods. Households are endowed with one unit of  time each period  and work h,'  hours (i=P, R) 
is consistent with  any wealth  distribution. If  the  discount factor is endogenous (rather than  constant), the  steady state determines a 
unique wealth distribution (see Epstein and  Hynes [1983]). AppendixA describes how  PP<  PR  yields concentrated capital ownership. 
 o or row in^ constraints are  necessary  to  ensure  a positive level of  steady-state consumption for  the  poor. Otherwise, poor 
households would  borrow  up  to  the  present value  of their  income  stream  to  finance current consumption. Here,  no  borrowing  is 
allowed. An  alternative would  be  to allow borrowing up  to some credit limit that  would always be  binding. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmduring period t. The symbol E, is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time 
t. The form of  the within-period utility function has been chosen for tractability and for comparability 
with previous business cycle literature. The coefficient of  relative risk  aversion for consumption is 
constant and equal to one for this function. 
The  fact  that  utility  is  linear in hours  worked  reflects  "indivisible labor"  as described  by 
Rogerson (1  988) and Hansen (1  985). This means that all variation in economywide hours worked is due 
to variations in the number of  employed workers as opposed to variations in hours per worker. In a 
decentralized economy, these authors show that the utility function in (1) can be supported by a lottery 
that randomly assigns workers to employment or unemployment each period, with the firm providing 
full unemployment insurance. Wage contracts call for households to be paid based on their expected, 
as opposed to actual, number of  hours worked. Real business cycle models with indivisible labor are 
better able to match some key characteristics of  aggregate labor market data.  Specifically, U.S.  data 
display a large volatility of hours worked relative to labor productivity and a weakly positive or even 
slightly negative correlation between hours and productivity.12 
The weights a and A in the utility functions are assumed to be  equal for both the rich and poor. 
Households maximize the utility function in (1) over consumption and leisure, subject to the following 
sequence of budget constraints: 
Cash-in-advance constraint:. 
Budget constraint of poor  households: 
P 
P  p  mt+1  P  p  mtp  cl, + c,,  + -  5 1 -7,  ) 8  w h  + -  + TR, ,  0<8<1. 
PI  p, 
''see  Hansen (1985), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and Hansen and Wright (1992). 
7 
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Equation (2) represents the cash-in-advance constraint faced by  all households. A requirement 
that this constraint hold with equality is imposed in the computation of government policy.13 Equations 
(3) and (4) are the within-period budget constraints of households. Poor households choose not to hold 
physical capital due to the assumption pP<pR. In the above constraints, ml,+,  represents nominal money 
balances carried into the next period, and P, is the price level in period t. Poor households are assumed 
to qualify for lump-sum government transfer payments TR, .  The timing of transfer payments is such that 
they supplement wage earnings and thus do not enter the cash-in-advance constraint. The term TR,  is 
intended to summarize, in an approximate way, the many forms of means-tested assistance provided by 
the government. Although explicit modeling of  specific assistance programs is  possible (such as the 
EITC), the basic  nature  of  the results depends not  on  the  form of  the  transfers, but rather on  the 
assumption that some portion is exogenous and cannot be directly taxed by the government. 
The terms x, and k, represent the rich household's investment and capital stock, respectively, and 
r, is the rental rate on capital. Since the poor have a lower labor efficiency, their equilibrium wage rate 
(Jw,) is lower than that of  the rich (w,). The tax rate on labor income (T~')  is allowed to vary between 
household types. Notice that marginal tax rates are the same as average tax rates here, but rich and poor 
households face different linear tax schedules. This is an approximation of  the nonlinear, progressive 
U.S. tax system, where marginal tax rates generally exceed average tax rates. Rich households pay taxes 
on capital income at the rate z,,  and 7, 6k, is the depreciation allowance built into the U.S. tax code. 
In equation (4), b,,,  represents real, one-period government bonds carried into period t+l by the rich. 
13~or  the constraint to be binding, the condition aUBc,,>  aUBc,  must hold in expected terms. This implies nonsatiation for real 
money balances. With logarithmic utility, this condition will be satisfied when E, [l/(l+p,+,)]  > 1/P, where p,+, is next period's money 
growth rate. Since P  is generally less than one (P=0.99 is a typical value for quarterly data), the constraint will bind whenever the 
expected money growth rate is positive, and even for negative expected growth rates that are sufficiently small. The Friedman (1969) 
optimal money rule is p=P-1 in steady state, which yields a nominal interest rate of zero. 
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b, (l+r,,) in real terms during period t.I4  Equation (5) is the law of motion for capital, given a constant 
rate of depreciation 6. Households view tax rates, transfer payments, wages, and interest rates as being 
determined outside the& control. The household decision variables in period t are c,,',  car, h,',  m  ',+,,  kt+,, 
and b,+, ,  i=P,  R. 
2.2  The Firm's  Problem 
Output  (Y,  )  is  produced  by  identical  competitive  firms  using  a  constant-return-to-scale 
technology.  Since profits are zero in equilibrium, there is no need  to model a market governing the 
ownership of firms. The production technology is subjected to serially correlated exogenous shocks (2,) 
that are revealed to agents at the beginning of period t. These shocks produce equilibrium business cycle 
fluctuations in the model. The firm's technology can be described as follows: 
Z1+,  = PzZI  +El+'  9  O<pz<l,  ~,+~-iid(~,),  z,  given. 
In (6), H, and Kt are the economywide labor and capital inputs.15  The (per capita) labor input 
of the poor is e^ hr. The fi's  problem is static because it simply rents capital and labor services from 
households each period, with the objective of  maximizing profits: Y,  -r, K, -w,  HI.  The firm's first-order 
14~he  inflation tax operates only on  real money balances in this model. The assumption of  indexed debt, though counterfactual, 
is needed to pin  down an equilibrium policy in  a model with money, capital, and  government bonds. I will come back to this point 
when  I describe the government's decision problem. 
15~here  is no need to distinguish between variables under the household's control and variables representing per capita quantities, 
as is necessary when solving directly for a decentralized, competitive equilibrium. As noted by  Lucas and Stokey (1983). solution of 
the government's decision problem yields a set of policies that dictate household equilibrium allocations. These allocations determine 
the equilibrium prices r,, w,, and PI.  Thus, prices are not outside the government's control as they are for households. 
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To facilitate solving for an equilibrium, a transformation of variables is performed to render the 
household problems stationary. Following Cooley and Hansen (1992), the transformation is -defined as 
The term  MI  is the economywide nominal money stock that evolves according to  MI+,  =  (l+h)Ml, 
where h is the growth rate observed at time t.  The government achieves the desired level of h by 
injecting new money into the economy through open-market operations. Since households use identical 
currency, h must be the same for all households, unlike tax  rates, which may differ between types. In 
equilibrium, the economywide money stock is the sum of household money stocks: MI =  ymr  + (1-y)m;. 
In transformed variables, the equilibrium condition is 1  =  y fir  + (I-y)fi;. 
23 Household Optimality 
As  a  preliminary  step  to  obtaining the  conditions  for  household  optimality,  the  variable 
transformations in (8) are applied to equations (1)-(5) and the cash-in-advance constraint is imposed with 
equality. This procedure yields the following Lagrangians for households: 
Poor households: 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmRich households: 
The household first-order conditions with  respect to the indicated variables and the associated 
transversality conditions are 
t  2.4  The Government's Problem 
The  government  chooses  an  optimal  program  of  distortionary  taxes,  money  growth,  and 
borrowing  to finance a stream of expenditures and transfers. The problem is a dynamic version of the 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmclassic Ramsey case, involving a Stackelberg game between the government and  household^.'^  To avoid 
time-consistency problems, I assume that the govemment can commit to a set of state-contingent policy 
rules announced at time zero. Also, to make the problem interesting, lump-sum taxes are ruled out. 
Otherwise, the  government would  elect  to  finance  all  future expenditures with  an initial  levy  on 
household assets.  With these assumptions, the government's problem can be summarized as follows: 
PPPRR  max  E~~(P~)~(w(c~~,  ~2~~  hl .  ~21~  hlR))v 
,  ,  1=O 
subject to: 
(i)  household first-order conditions and budget constraints 
(ii)  firm profit-maximization conditions 
(iii)  gl +yTRl + (1-y )bl(l  +r,,) = y [.r:6w,hlP]  + (l-~)[.r:w~h.~  + .r,,(rl-6)kl] 
(iv)  M,+, = ( 1 +p,)  Ml,  where  Ml  = y mlP  + (1  -y lmtR 
(v)  TRl 2 FR  > 0 
(vi)  lin~ (1  -Y  )b, 
= 0. 
The  government  employs  discount  factor  PG  in  maximizing  a  sequence  of  within-period 
objective functions, W(.).  The choice of  PG  and W(. ) will be discussed shortly. Constraints (i) and 
(ii)  summarize  rational  maximizing  behavior  on  the  part  of  private  agents  and  constitute 
"implementability" constraints on the government's choice of policy. Constraint (iii) is the government 
budget constraint, where the term p&4, lPl ( =  p, lp,  ) represents seigniorage. Constraint (iv) describes the 
16~he  dynamic Ramsey problem in  a representative-agent framework  has  been  studied  by  numerous authors. A partial list 
employing  general-equilibrium models with either money or capital is Helpman and Sadka (1979), Kydland and Prescott (1980), 
Turnovsky and Brock (1980), Lucas and  Stokey (1983),  Chamley (1986), Lucas (1990), Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1992), Zhu 
(1992), Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991), and Braun (1993). Models with both money and capital are analyzed by  Drazen (1979) 
and  Chamley (1985a). 
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government  must  provide  poor  households  with  a  minimum  level  of  transfer  payments,  TR. In 
equilibrium,  this  constraint  is  always  binding  such  that  TR, =TR for  all  t.17  Finally,  (vi)  is  a 
transversality condition that ensures the government budget constraint is satisfied in present-value terms. 
Since the model includes heterogeneous households, the question arises as to what form the 
government objective function should take. In  the words of  Arrow and KUR (1970), "no definitive 
criterion can be given that will withstand all criticism." I suggest, therefore, an  analytically tractable 
version reflecting the basic premise that the government cares about household welfare, where welfare 
is measured by  some concave function of  household consumption and leisure. Within this class, the 
qualitative behavior of the model is robust to the choice of a specific function. To minimize introduction 
of  new  parameters,  the  function  W(-) is  assumed  to  be  an  additively  separable  combination  of 
household  within-period  utility  functions,  W(. )  = $17  '(-) + U  R(.).  This  choice  implies  that  the 
government respects household valuation of utility within a given period. The parameter $ >  0 controls 
how much the policymaker favors one group over the other. For example, the weight assigned to the 
welfare of a given group may exceed the value implied by the group's relative number in the population. 
The govemment's  discount factor PG need not coincide with household discount factors. The 
case in which public and private discount factors differ is termed fiturity divergence by Arrow and KUR 
(1970). To support an equilibrium with public debt, however, I assume that the govemment's discount 
factor coincides with that of rich households (pG=pR).  I thus attribute the government with having more 
patience  than  the  poor,  an  assumption  that  seems  quite' reasonable  considering  the  existence  of 
government-mandated  savings  programs  like  Social  Security,  long-term  investments  in  public 
infrastructure, and the government's willingness to subsidize activities that build human capital, such 
as job training and basic education.''  The choice of pG=pR  and the form of W(.)  yield a government 
17~emoving  the constraint essentially provides  the  government  with  a  nondistortionary  tax  instrument. In  this  case,  the 
equilibrium value of  TR,  is highly negative, which indicates that the government would like to impose a large lump-sum tax on the 
poor, allowing other distortionary taxes to be lowered. Lump-sum taxes have been ruled out to focus on a "second-best" equilibrium. 
'*If the government is myopic relative to savers (pG<pR),  an equilibrium with government debt can be restored by introducing 
an  exogenous limit on public borrowing (which would always be binding) or by  imposing an exogenous cost of borrowing (which 
increases with the level of  debt). The assumption pG=pR  avoids these additional complications, but is not crucial for the basic results. 
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the transformation places more weight on the future utility of  the poor.19 
A simple feedback rule is assumed to link government spending on goods and services (g,) to 
a measure of income inequality in the economy. The law of motion for g, is 
In (13), government spending consists of  both exogenous and endogenous outlays, where gand 
q are positive constants. Exogenous spending follows a stationary stochastic process subject to serially 
correlated shocks (v, ) that are revealed to agents at the beginning of  period t. Endogenous spending is 
assumed to depend linearly on the difference in income between households of each type, where income 
is measured by funds available for consumption after taxes are paid and transfer payments are re~eived.~' 
The parameter q is the semi-elasticity of government spending with respect to income inequality. The 
linear form simplifies computations, but is not crucial for any results. For all parameter values examined, 
endogenous spending is positive. As a further simplification, households derive no direct utility from 
government spending; it is simply a drain on productive resources. 
The vector ?=IT,,  z,,  K} summarizes government policy implemented at time t.  The interest 
rate on government bonds (r,,) is not an independent policy variable in this model. This restriction, 
combined with the assumption that debt is indexed against inflation, is necessary to pin down a unique 
policy in equilibrium. As Zhu (1992) and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) have shown, allowing 
Oudiz and Sachs (1985) examine a structural macroeconomic model with a myopic government. Arrow and Kurz  (1970),  Atkinson 
and Sandmo (1980),  and Stiglitz (1987)  consider the opposite case where government is less myopic than households. 
190ne version  of  a  social welfare function  is  SWF(-)=yx(PP)'  Ur + (I-y)x(pR)'U:. The  government's  objective here  is 
C(pR)'  (our + UP),  which  allows for  "imperfect altruism." Perfect altruism would  imply @=[y/(l-y)](pP/pR)'.  When  p<pR, the 
value of $ defined in this way approaches zero as r  increases. By restricting I$= constant >0,  the government's objective represents 
a transformation of SWF(-). 
20~trictly  speaking, the funds available for consumption in (13)  should also include the after-tax interest payments on government 
debt held  by  rich households. For  the levels of  government debt examined in  this model, the additional income is small and is 
neglected to avoid complication. 
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equilibrium values of these two variables. To see why, note that the household fmt-order conditions for 
kt+,  and b,,, in (1 1) represent an ex ante arbitrage condition on expected returns from bonds and capital. 
Ex post, after shocks to the economy are revealed, the government is free to alter the combination of 
2, and r,, in many different ways to raise necessary revenue yet still satisfy ex ante arbitrage. A unique 
policy can be  pinned  down by  imposing  restrictions that  reduce the degrees of  freedom in setting 
effective bond returns. With indexed bonds, the government is  prevented from using state-contingent 
inflation to manipulate the rate of return. One more degree of freedom can be removed by requiring the 
arbitrage condition to hold ex post as well as ex ante. The interest rate on government bonds is thus 
determined by  rb,=  (I-z,)(r,  - 8). It  must  be  pointed  out, however, that  since  other  restrictions are 
possible, the model alone cannot pin down a unique prediction for the time-series behavior of  T,.~'  Ex 
post arbitrage imposes "certainty equivalence" on the government's use of debt. Certainty equivalence 
is also exploited in computing a solution to the model, because the method involves a linear-quadratic 
approximation of the government's decision problem. 
The summation of the household budget constraints and the government budget constraint yields 
the following resource constraint for the economy. Note that the resource constraint and the government 
budget constraint are not independent equations. To simphfy the formulation, the resource constraint is 
used in place of  the government budget constraint in the recursive version of the problem. 
Y [c1:  + c,:]  + (l-Y)[c1:  + c,:  + x,] + g,  =  Y,. 
2.5  Recursive Formulation of the Problem 
The  government's  problem  under  commitment  can  be  solved  using  the  unique  recursive 
algorithm  developed  by  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1980).  Standard recursive methods cannot  be  used 
210ther  restrictions might be a period-by-period balanced  budget constraint (so that government debt is not a state variable) or 
the assumption that either r,, or  z,  is not state contingent (the equilibrium value is not a function of state variables). 
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optimum decision rules, which must be incorporated into the return function W(.),  depend not only on 
current policy, but also on the anticipated sequence of future policies. The value of the return function 
W(.)  at time t is thus dependent on future policy variables z,,,  ,  z,,,  ,  and p,,,  for j>0.  This influence 
of future policy on  current returns destroys the recursivity  of  the problem. However, the method of 
Kydland and Prescott allows the problem to be redefined in a way that recovers a recursive structure. 
The crucial aspect involves defining the lagged shadow prices hP,, and hR,, to be pseudo state variables. 
Including these prices in the state vector provides a link to the past by  which the policymaker at time 
t takes into account the fact that household decisions in earlier periods depend on  current policy by 
means of expectations. This link to the past is crucial in order to solve the commitment problem using 
dynamic programming. In a no-commitment regime, the policymaker at  time t ignores the effect of 
current policy on household decisions in earlier periods.23 
To reformulate (12), we  first substitute the household first-order conditions in (1 1) into the 
transformed household budget constraints, as seen in the Lagrangians. The substitution eliminates z,, 
z,,  p,, cDP,  and cDR  and yields the following set of equations?" 
22~ellman  (1957), pp. 81-83. Bellman defines a recursive problem as one in which the optimal decision rules depend only on 
current-period state variables. 
23~n  game theoretic terms, the government's optimal strategy  under commitment is "memory  based," where hP,,  and hR,., 
summarize the history of the game. Under no commitment, there are potentially many equilibrium strategies, including "memoryless" 
strategies that are functions only of current-period state variables z,, v,,  k,, and b,. Oudiz and Sachs (1985) provide an excellent. 
summary of  these equilibrium concepts in the context of a structural macroeconomic model. 
%~ue  to  the presence of  the expectation operator in  the first-order  conditions for  kt+, and  b,,,  the substitution  has  been 
accomplished using the expression  E ,,  f,  (-)=f,(.) - u ,, where f,  (.)  is  a function of random variables and u ,  is the forecast error. 
The assumption of rational expectations implies E ,.,u  ,=O. 
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for income inequality in the feedback rule for government spending. The result is 
The first-order condition form,,,  can be used to obtain a useful relation between rji;  and m:: 
Finally, c,,'  and c,'  ( i =  P,  R)  are eliminated from both the return function W(.)  and the resource 
constraint (14) using the cash-in-advance constraints and the first-order condition for c,'.  The vector of 
state variables for the government's  problem is  s,  = {z,,  v,  ,  kt,  b, ,  Apt-,, hR,,).  In  the transformed 
problem, the govemment's decision variables are fii1+,  ,  h,' ,  h', ,  kt+,  ,  b,+,  , i =  P,  R. Using primes (') to 
denote next-period quantities, the recursive version of.the government's problem is shown in (19). 
The Bellman equation in (19) summarizes the recursive nature of the problem. The first line of 
constraints lists the cash-in-advance constraints and the first-order conditions for credit goods.  The 
second line is the relationship between household money stocks from (18); and the transfer payment 
constraint. The next three lines are the household budget constraints and the resource constraint. The 
remaining constraints define the production technology and the laws of motion for g,  k, z, and v. 
The dynamic programming problem defined in (1  9) applies for all t >  0.  The problem at t=O  must 
be considered separately, as shown by  Kydland and Prescott (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1983), and 
Charnley (1986). At t=O, the stocks of capital, bonds, and money are fixed. Optimal policy thus implies 
very  high  values  for the initial tax  rate  on  capital and the initial money  growth rate,  to take full 
advantage of  nondistortionary sources of  revenue.  I  assume that  this form of  lump-sum taxation is 
insufficient to finance the entire stream of  future expenditures. 
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d  ':.  k'.  b' 
hi.)t, i-P,R 
where:  s =  { Z,  v,  k,  b, h!l,  hfl 1 
P  P  W(.)  =@UP(c1,c2,hP)  +UR(c;,c;,hR) 
subject to: 
The analysis here will focus on policy in stationary stochastic equilibrium, i.e., when t is very 
large. The linear-quadratic approximation method used to solve (19) is accurate only in the neighborhood 
of the deterministic steady state. Consequently, I do not solve the t=O  problem or compute the transition 
path to the stationary equilibrium. One complication that arises with this approach is that the steady-state 
level of  government debt cannot be  determined solely on  the basis  of  steady-state analysis. Rather, 
steady-state debt is a function of  both the initial level of debt, b,, and the entire transition path of  taxes 
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computation, I simply choose the level of steady-state debt to reflect a debt-to-GNP ratio consistent with 
U.S.  data. I assume that b, and the transition path are set such that the government budget constraint is 
satisfied in present-value terms.25  ,' 
Kydland and Prescott (1980) prove the existence of a stationary equilibrium in a representative 
household version of the Rarnsey problem. Proving existence and uniqueness of a stationary equilibrium 
in this model is difficult due to the borrowing constraints imposed on poor households. Instead, I simply 
assume that some (unspecified) institutional mechanismprohibits the use of time-varying policy rules. 
Equilibrium is defined as a value function V(s) and an associated set of stationary decision rules that 
satisfy (19). The decision rules dictate a set of household allocations and prices at time t that can be 
implemented by means of  the government's chosen policy. The government's explicit policy rules for 
tax rates and money growth can be recovered by substituting the implementable allocations and prices 
into the household first-order conditions and budget constraints and by imposing r,,  =  (1-7,  )(r, - 6). 
3.  Computation Procedure 
The dynamic programming problem in (19) is solved numerically using a variant of the linear- 
quadratic approximation technique first used by Kydland and Prescott (1982). An approximate version 
of (19) is obtained by first substituting all nonlinear constraints into the government's objective function 
W(.)  and then forming a qua.dratic approximation of the resulting expression in terms of the logarithms 
of all variables.16 The solution algorithm exploits the certainty equivalence property of linear-quadratic 
control problems. The optimal decision rules for the approximated economy can be obtained by solving 
the deterministic version of the model."  An initial guess V,,  is made for the optimal value function V(s) 
25~he  indeterminacy of steady-state debt is discussed by Chamley (1985b). Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) show how the steady- 
state level of debt can be computed by  explicitly modeling the transition path in a life-cycle model with no uncertainty. 
 he log-linear  version  of  the Kydland-Prescott  method is described  in  Christian0  (1988).  A step-by-step guide to linear- 
quadratic solution algorithms can be found in Hansen and Prescott (1991). 
Sargent (1987), p. 36. Specifically,  the stochastic terms E,,  4,  u:,  and u;  are set equal to their unconditional means 
(zero) in  the numerical algorithm. With a quadratic objective, the first-order conditions are linear in  all variables. This allows the 
expectation operator in  (19) to be passed through the expressions, dropping out any stochastic terms. 
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successively iterating on the Bellman equation until the value function has converged, i.e., until Vi  is 
sufficiently close to V,,.  Once the process has converged, log-linear decision rules that dictate household 
equilibrium allocatioxis are computed. Log-linear policy rules for T,,  T,,  and R can then be computed 
using the household first-order conditions in (1  1) and the household budget constraints, log-linearized 
around the steady state. To improve accuracy during the simulations, the nonlinear versions of the policy 
rules are used in computing period-by-period values for the policy variables. 
4.  Calibration of the Model 
To explore the quantitative predictions of the model, as many parameters as possible are assigned 
values in advance based on empirically observed features of postwar U.S.  data. Parameter choices are 
also guided by the desire to obtain steady-state values for key model variables that are consistent with 
postwar averages in the U.S.  economy. For parameters that are difficult to pin down, such as q, @,  and 
TR,  a range of values is examined. Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter values and is followed 
by a brief explanation of how they were selected. 
Table 1:  Baseline Parameter Set 
Agent  Parameters and Values 
Households 
Finns 
y~~~  = 0.02 
Government  g/Y = 0.22  p, = 0.95  0, = 0.02 
(1- y) bfl  = 0.25 
The relative number of poor households (  y) determines the distribution of wealth and income 
in the model. Using data from the  1983 Survey  of  Consumer Finance, McDermed, Clark, and Men 
(1989) estimate a Lorenz curve that summarizes the highly skewed distribution of wealth in the U.S. 
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(based on net worth). Here, poor households have no wealth. The choice w.80  implies that the richest 
20 percent of  households in the model  own  100 percent of  the  wealth, a distribution that roughly 
approximates the  empirical Lorenz curve. For the  model,  it can be  shown that the analytical Gini 
coefficient (based on  wealth) is equal to y.  The value w.80  is very close to empirical estimates of 
wealth-based Gini coefficients for the U.S.  economy. Using data on household net worth, Wolff and 
Marley (1989) report Gini coefficients of 0.772 for 1962 and 0.788 for 1983.28 
The parameter a determines the relative importance of cash versus credit goods in the household 
utility  function. Empirical estimates of  this  parameter vary,  depending  on  the  choice of  monetary 
aggregate  and the sample period.  Cooley  and Hansen (1992) estimate  a value of  @.84.  Using  a 
somewhat different utility function, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) estimate the relative weight on 
cash goods to be 0.43. The chosen value of  0.6 lies about midway between the two estimates. It turns 
out that higher values of a induce the government to choose higher rates of  inflation in equilibrium. 
The parameter A is picked to yield an economywide average number of hours worked close to 
0.3. This is consistent with time-use studies, such as Juster and Stafford (1991), which indicate that 
households spend approximately one-third of  their discretionary time in market work.29 
The time  period  in the model is taken  to be  one quarter. With  quarterly time periods, the 
common discount factor for rich  households  and the  government is set at  pR=pG=0.99.  This  value 
implies an annual rate of  time preference equal to 4 percent. The discount factor for poor households 
is set at PP=0.985, which implies an annual time preference rate of 6.2 percent. Engen (1992) estimates 
annual rates of time preference in the range of 4 to 7.9 percent, while Lawrance (1991) estimates rates 
in the range of 0 to 19 percent. In Lawrance's study (tables 3 and 5), time preference rates of households 
with below-median incomes are 2 to 5 percentage points higher than those with above-median incomes. 
28~he  Gini coefficient is a measure of  inequality that ranges between zero and one. A value of zero implies no  inequality among 
households. A value of one implies all wealth  (or income) accrues to a single household. The coefficient can be computed by  taking 
twice the area  between  the Lorenz curve and  the 45 degree diagonal. 
29~n  the model, poor households spend a larger fraction of their time working than  do  rich households, hP >  hR.  This is because 
the rich derive a substantial portion  of their income from capital and  earn  a higher hourly wage. 
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those with college educations. The chosen values for PP  and PR  imply time preference rates for the poor 
that are about 2 percentage points higher than rates for the rich. 
The share of output that represents payments to capital (8) is set at 0.36, about midway in the 
range of  0.25  to 0.43 estimated by  Christian0 (1988). The quarterly depreciation rate  of  &O.025 is 
commonly used and, together with PR  and 8,  yields a realistic steady-state ratio of economywide capital 
to output of  8.5 and a ratio of total investment to output of  0.21.  The process governing technology 
shocks has  been  estimated by  Prescott (1986). The parameters governing the  shocks, pz=0.95 and 
0,=0.007,  represent values commonly used in real business cycle models. 
Empirical estimates of the labor efficiency parameter (e")  as a function of  savings behavior or 
wealth are not available. Estimates are available, however, as a function of age and education. Using 
panel  data  on  labor  earnings,  Engen  (1992)  estimates  e"  as  a  quadratic  function  of  age  over  an 
individual's lifetime for various education levels. Three-fourths of the sample consumers have no college 
education. The ratio of the average lifetime e"  for individuals with no college education to those with a 
college  education is  about 0.75.  If  the  non-saving, poor  households  in  this  model. are viewed  as 
representing individuals with no college education, then the empirical evidence would suggest a value 
of e"=0.75. The values of  e"  and y affect the skewness of  the income distribution in the model. As an 
additional calibration source, the distribution of  income in the model can be compared to the U.S. 
economy. Rich households in the model earn 42 percent of total income (before taxes and transfers). 
This figure coincides with the average share earned by the top fifth of  U.S.  households from 1947 to 
1989. The model's  income-based Gini coefficient is 0.22, a value somewhat lower than the average 
value of 0.37 for the postwar U.S.  economy.30 
The semi-elasticity parameter q controls the degree to which government spending responds to 
income inequality. It turns out that the value of q (together with PR  and y)  determines the steady-state 
level of 2,.  Given the values for PR  and y described above, q is  set to yield 2,=0.41.  This tax rate is 
about midway in the range of estimates for the average marginal tax rate on capital in the U.S. economy. 
30~ee  Rosen  (1992), table 8.1, and  Economic Report of the President, 1992, chapter 4, chart 4-4. 
22 
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To put this number in perspective, federal and state aid to local governments averaged 3.6 percent of 
GNP from 1950 to 1988 (see Rosen [19921, table 21.4). A range of values for q is also investigated. 
The law of motion for exogenous spending, gexp  (v,), is designed to mimic the quarterly time 
series of  government purchases of goods and services in the U.S. economy. Data on total government 
purchases were used in the estimation because it is not possible to isolate and exclude that portion driven 
by income inequality. Exogenous spending accounts for about 80 percent of g, in the model, however. 
The value of gis set to yield a steady-state ratio of  total government purchases to GNP of  0.22, the 
postwar  U.S.  average.  The parameters p,  and o5  govern  the  behavior  of  the  exogenous spending 
The value of TR is set to approximate the average ratio of transfer payments to GNP in the U.S. 
economy. This ratio varies, depending on the type of payments included in the definition. Means-tested 
transfer payments (including in-kind transfers) increased from 1.2 percent of GNP in 1965 to 3.6 percent 
in  1988. If  social insurance programs (Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance) are 
included in the definition, the average level of  transfer payments from 1950 to 1990 increases to more 
than  6 percent  of  GNP. It  turns  out  that  the  value  of TR significantly affects  the  government's 
equilibrium choice of  money growth. Therefore, the steady-state ratio of  transfer payments to GNP 
is set at 0.02, and a range of  values is investigated. The steady-state ratio of  government 
debt to GNP is set at 0.25. This value is at the lower end of the range of net federal debt as a share of 
GNP since 1950. The basic results are not significantly affected by  the level of  steady-state debt.32 
The parameter 0 controls how much the government favors one group relative to the other and 
thus significantly affects the progressivity of equilibrium labor taxes. I choose 0 such that the revenue- 
weighted average of 7, across all households is close to estimates for the U.S.  economy. The baseline 
31~he  law  of  motion  for  exogenous  government  spending  is  equivalent  to  the  following  AR(1)  specification: 
ln g,  = (I-p)ln g+  pln g ,., + 5,. Using this form, Christian0 and  Eichenbaum (1992) estimate p=0.96 and  0\=0.02. 
32~ata  on government purchases and total transfer payments are from Citibase. Data on net federal debt to GNP are from Federal 
Deb1 and Interest Costs, Congressional Budget Office (1993). Data on  means-tested transfers are from Rosen (1992) and  Economic 
Report  of  the President, 1992, chapter 4. 
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5.  Quantitative Properties of the Model 
5.1  Steady-State Experiments 
Figures 1-4 show the effect on steady-state policy of varying four key parameters in the model, 
namely, q,  $,  TR,  and  In  each figure, only a single parameter is varied, with remaining parameters 
set at the baseline values in table 1. 
Figure 1 shows the effect of varying q,  which controls the sensitivity of government spending 
to income inequality. An  analytical expression for the optimal steady-state tax on capital as a function 
of q can be derived and is shown below. 
2,=1-  P  1  where  p  =--I  (PR=pG). 
P+6 '  P  +T-  PR 
1  -Y 
Equation (20) is derived by  combining the government's first-order condition for k,+,  with the 
corresponding household first-order condition in (1 1) and making use of the assumption pR=pG.  When 
q=0, the result is 7,  =O.  Notice that the steady-state tax on capital is not affected by  $,  the weight placed 
on the poor's welfare in the government objective function. These results agree with those proved in 
Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) in models with no externalities. From (201, we see that &,/a  >O  and 
&,/a>O.  Higher levels of capital accumulation accentuate income inequality. This effect imposes a 
negative externality on the economy (as determined by q)  in the form of higher public spending because 
the  additional spending must be  financed by  distortionary taxation. Positive values of  7,  force rich 
households to help pay for this externality. An increase in q also tends to reinforce the progressivity of 
labor taxes. As  the number of  poor households (y) increases, the income distribution becomes more 
skewed. This increase in inequality causes more spending, calling for higher levels of  7,.  Figure  1 
shows that the amount of endogenous spending necessary to induce high levels of 7, is relatively small, 
33~ith  @=2.7,  the government places less weight on the within-period utility of the poor thin is implied by  their relative number. 
With  ~0.80  and  1-~0.20,  there are  four  times as many  poor  households as rich. Here, the government places only 2.7 times as 
much  weight on the poor's within-period utility. This behavior  might be justified either as a way  of  compensating for  pG>pP or as 
a reflection of lower voting rates among the poor. The model abstracts from an  explicit description of political equilibrium, however. 
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Figure  2  shows  the  effect  of  varying  the  political  weighting  factor  0.  When  Q=0,  the 
government's optimal policy calls for highly regressive labor taxes. This is  because the government 
views the poor's labor supply as completely inelastic and thus it imposes a very high tax on this activity, 
in accordance with Rarnsey's principle of optimal taxation.  As  $I  increases, labor taxes become more 
progressive. Due to the diminishing marginal utility property of U'  (.), the government perceives more 
benefits from a dollar in the hands of  the poor than a dollar in the hands of  the rich. 
Figure 3 shows that the quarterly money growth rate (which equals the quarterly inflation rate 
in steady state) increases rapidly with the level of  required transfer payments FR.  In a standard cash-in- 
advance model with utility functions of the form used here and no externalities, optimal money growth 
adheres to the Friedman rule.34 In this model, transfer payments represent a negative externality for the 
government because they are not taxed but must be financed by distortionary taxation. This  drives a 
wedge between the government's marginal utility of  consumption and that of households. Moreover, 
transfer payments induce the poor to work less and cause their labor supply to become more elastic, thus 
increasing the distortionary costs of  labor taxation. To spread out distortionary costs across tax bases, 
the government levies a tax  on consumption in  the form of  inflation. In a representative household 
version  of  the  model, with  Y=  1 and  pG=pP=p,  it is  possible  to  derive  the  following steady-state 
expression for optimal money growth: 
From (21), when TR=O  the result is p=p- 1 (the Friedman rule). The term A, >  0 is the Lagrange 
multiplier on the household budget constraint in the government's first-order conditions. This represents 
the perceived benefit to the government of  increasing private consumption by  one unit. When TR >  0, 
optimal monetary policy calls for a positive nominal interest rate in  steady state. The government's 
inability to tax transfers directly motivates the imposition of a tax through the back door, by  raising the 
34~ecall  that  the  Friedman  rule in steady state is p=P-1.  For  further discussion, see the references cited in footnote 8. 
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results may not go through in the presence of externalities. At the baseline level of transfers, quarterly 
money growth is p=0.014, implying an  optimal inflation rate of  about 6 percent per year. 
Figure 4 shows the effect of increasing the steady-state ratio of government purchases to GNP. 
The ratio is varied by increasing  which controls the level of  exogenous purchases. As g/Y increases, 
tax  rates on labor increase in a linear fashion. It is efficient for the government to finance long-run 
(steady-state) increases in g with labor taxes because the long-run elasticity of labor supply is less than 
the  long-run elasticities of  capital or money balances. As  labor tax  rates approach 0.60, the money 
growth rate accelerates dramatically. At this point, maximum revenue is being collected from labor taxes. 
As required spending continues to go up, the government is forced to rely more heavily on seigniorage. 
Revenues from seigniorage are limited by households' willingness to hold money balances, as measured 
by the parameter a. From (21), higher values of a result in higher money growth rates. 
As a final steady-state experiment, table 2 compares revenues collected from various sources in 
the model  and in the postwar U.S. economy. Model results are for the baseline parameters, and  all 
revenues are normalized by GNP. The labor tax is the largest source of revenue. The capital tax provides 
significantly less revenue than the labor tax, even though the tax rate on capital is higher in the model. 
This is due to the depreciation allowance. Finally, seigniorage is the smallest source of  revenue. The 
relative sizes of revenue compare remarkably well with the U.S. averages. However, revenue sources 
in the data do not always fit neatly into one of the three categories. 
Table 2:  RevenuelGNP from Different Sources 
Source of Revenue  Model  U.S. Economy" 
Labor Income Tax  0.177  0.159 
Capital Income Tax  0.062  0.067 
Seigniorage  0.0046  0.0035 
a~ax  revenues are average values from various issues of Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, 1965-1990,  table 
61. Labor tax revenue is defined to  include federal and  state individual income taxes and  Social Security taxes. Capital tax  revenue 
is defined to include federal and  state corporate taxes, capital gains taxes, and  property  taxes. Seigniorage is from Neumann (1992) 
for  1951 -90, defined as (M,  -M,, )/P,, where MI is the monetary base. 
3s~his  interpretation is basedon a discussion of transfers in  Jones, Manuelli, and  Rossi (1992),  p. 36. 
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5.2.1  Optimal Policy Rules 
The solution to the approximate version of  (19) yields the following set of  log-linear optimal 
policy rules, which are valid in the neighborhood of  the deterministic steady state. 
Table 3:  Optimal Policy Rules 
Constant  ZI  "I  In (k,  In (b  I)  In (KI )  11, (KI) 
Shocks to the government budget are caused by unexpected changes in the size of  the tax base 
or by  unexpected increases in exogenous spending requirements. The government's optimal response to 
these shocks can be seen by  examining the coefficients on state variables z ,  and v, . For example, a 
positive technology shock causes large decreases in 7, and p, (in proportion to their steady-state values) 
relative to 7,. A positive z, causes GNP and household incomes (the tax base) to rise, allowing revenue 
requirements to be  met  with  lower taxes. In contrast, a positive expenditure shock (v,) calls for an 
increase in 2,  and p, to collect additional required revenue. Absorbing shocks in this way is efficient 
because capital and money balances are completely inelastic within a given period. Judd (1989) and 
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) also obtain shock-absorbing behavior in related models. Notice that 
the policy rule for & reflects the notion of countercyclical monetary policy, in that money growth moves 
opposite  to  output  fluctuations.  However,  the  neoclassical  framework  precludes  any  role  for 
"stabilization" in the sense of preventing large swings in unemployment over the business cycle. 
The shock-absorbing features of  7, and U. allow the government to maintain relatively stable 
tax  rates  on  labor,  reminiscent  of  the  tax-rate-smoothing hypothesis  of  Barro  (1979,  1986). This 
hypothesis has been the subject of  numerous empirical studies designed to test whether tax rates or 
inflation follows a random walk (or martingale).36  In this model, however, the optimal policy rules show 
36~ee,  for example, Sahasakul (1986), Mankiw (1987), and Bizer and Durlauf (1990). 
27 
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As a direct test of the model, it would be desirable to compare the policy rules in table 3 with 
empirical versions estimated with U.S.  data. An estimation problem exists, however, because shadow 
prices hP,,  and hRcl  are unobservable. Kydland and Prescott (1980) point out that the ratio &-,/I,  could 
conceivably be estimated from the household's first-order conditions, but this still allows the shadow 
prices to be scaled in an arbitrary way. Empirical testing of  key characteristics of  the optimal policy 
rules is an area for future research.38 
5.2.2  Policy Simulations 
Figures 5-10 plot simulated policy from the model together with U.S.  data on marginal tax rates 
and money growth. Tables 4 and 5 provide a quantitative comparison of  the series. In these tables, the 
inflation tax rate, defined as ~c,  =  (P,  - P,-,  )/PI, has also been included. Although  is  the instrument of 
monetary policy directly under the government's control, n, has the advantage of lying between zero 
and one, analogous to the other tax rates 2,  and 2,.  The two measures of  monetary policy are related 
by q  =l - p,,  1  [PI  (l+p,,)],  where p, is defined in (8). 
The model does reasonably well in capturing the standard deviations and serial correlations of 
the policy variables (table 4), but is less successful regarding the contemporaneous correlations (tables 
5a and 5b). A basic prediction is that the capital tax and the inflation tax should both be  more volatile 
than  the  labor tax, a feature generally confirmed by  the data. The capital tax series  estimated by 
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), shown in column 3, has a much higher standard deviation than the series 
estimated by  Joines  (1981), shown  in  column  4.  The values are  16.38 percent  and  5.09  percent, 
respectively. The Jorgenson and Sullivan series is an estimate of the effective corporate tax rate, while 
the  Joines  series  also includes  property  taxes  and  taxes paid  by  individuals on  capital gains  and 
dividends. Neither series takes into account the imputed subsidy on investment in residential housing. 
- - -  -  -- 
37~his  point was originally made by  Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991). 
38~he  coefficients on  lipI.,  are equal to zero in table 2 because poor households do not save. In fact, since lip,.,  is directly related 
to hRl.,  by  (18), hP,.,  could have been  eliminated as a state variable. 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmOther estimates of U.S. tax rates on capital can be found in Auerbach and Poterba (1988), Fullerton and 
Karayannis (1987), King and Fullerton (1984), Jorgenson and Yun (1989), and Judd (1989). 
Table 4:  Simulated Policy versus U.S.  Economy (All Variables Detrended) 
u.s  U.S. 
Modela  Economyb  Economy' 
Mean  0.278 
Std. Dev. (%)  0.99 
7h:  COIT (-1)  0.49 
corr (-2)  0.01 
CO~  (-3)  -0.22  -0.67  -0.59 
Mean  0.412  0.299  0.540 
Std. Dev. (%)  8.41  16.38  5.09 
=kt  COIT  (-1) 
corr (-2) 
CO~  (-3)  -0.21  -0.24  -0.37 
Mean  0.06 1  0.048  0.050 
22.50  Std. Dev. (%)  50.50  29.78 
Pt  COIT  (-1)  0.48 
corr (-2)  -0.01 
COIT  (-3)  -0.22  -0.18  -0.24 
Mean  0.056  0.040  0.041 
Std. Dev. (%)  28.0 1  49.75  36.28 
'=,  corr (-1) 
corr (-2) 
'Model  statistics are means over 100 simulations, each 124 quarters long. During each simulation, annualized series were 
constructed using revenueweighted averages to compute tax rates and  end-of-year money stocks and prices to  compute p, and n:. 
The annualized series were then  detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of  100. 
bHere,  z,  is from Barro and Sahasakul(1986) for 1947-83, z,  is from Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981, table 11) for 1947-80, 
pf is based on the MI series constructed by  Rasche (1987) for 1947-89, and n,  is based on the CPI (all items) from Citibase for 1947- 
89. Data for pI and q  were annualized as in the model, and all variables were detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
'Here,  2,  and z,  are from Joines (1981, tables 2 and  10) for 1947-75, where z,  is "MTRL4 and  z,  is "MTRK." Data 
for p, are from the monetary base series in  Citibase for 1947-89, and q is based  on  the GNP deflator for 1947-89, also from Citibase. 
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'~odel  statistics are means over 100 simulations. where all series have been annualized and detrended as in table 4. 
Table 5b:  Contemporaneous Correlation in U.S.  Economva 
*~n  asterisk indicates that the correlation coefficient has the same sign as in  the model. The top and bottom numbers in 
each cell represent correlations using the U.S.  variables described in footnotes a and b, respectively, of table 4. The U.S. series were 
each annualized and detrended over periods for which a full set of variables was available. For the top numbers, this period was 1947- 
80. For the bottom numbers, the period was 1947-75. 
Also from table 4, we see that the tax rate on labor in the model has a much  lower standard 
deviation than either U.S. series (0.99 percent versus 5.65  or 4.44 percent).  Money growth and the 
inflation tax both display very high standard deviations (more than 20 percent). Comparisons with the 
data are slightly more favorable for the monetary base series (as opposed to M1) and the GNP deflator 
series (as opposed to the CPI index). In a related model, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) report a 
much higher standard deviation for simulated money growth than the value shown here. However, their 
model includes nominal government debt, and the inflation tax is the only available shock absorber. 
The correlation coefficients in the model match the signs in U.S. data for about half the cases 
in  table  5.  The model  generally predicts strong correlations among the variables, while many U.S. 
correlations (which are based on only 29 to 34  observations) are quite weak and can even vary in sign, 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/Workpaper/Index.cfmdepending on the source. All variables have been detrended in table 5 because the U.S. labor tax and 
money growth rate both display upward trends, while the U.S.  capital tax displays a slight downward 
trend  (see figures 5, 7, and 9). These trends have no counterpart in the model because the ratio of 
government outlays to GNP is stationary. In U.S.  data, the ratio of outlays to GNP has risen over time, 
mainly due to the rapid growth in transfer payments. From figures 3 and 4, the model predicts that 
higher steady-state outlays relative to GNP should be accompanied by increases in the labor tax and the 
money growth rate.39 
Another basic prediction of the model is that the labor tax should be negatively correlated with 
inflation (and  money  growth), while the correlation between the capital tax  and inflation should be 
positive. Partial-equilibrium models generally do not distinguish between labor and capital taxes and 
predict a positive correlation between a single "income tax" and inflation. This failure to distinguish 
between factor incomes may help to explain the conflicting findings of previous U.S.  and cross-country 
empirical studies designed to test for the partial-equilibrium result (see Mankiw  [1987], Roubini and 
Sachs [1989], Poterba and Rotemberg [I9901 and Roubini [1991]). 
As a final check of the model's dynamic behavior, tables 6 and 7 summarize predictions for key 
business cycle statistics. Table 6 shows the corresponding statistics from Cooley and Hansen (1989), 
who study a cash-in-advance model with no distortionary taxes and exogenous stochastic money growth. 
The model statistics are virtually identical to the Cooley-Hansen results. Table 7 displays the model 
predictions for two labor market statistics that have received particular attention in recent real business 
cycle literature, namely 1) the volatility of hours worked relative to labor productivity, o,,/o,,,  ,  and 2) 
the contemporaneous correlation between hours and productivity, corr(H,YIH ). The model results are 
comparable to those obtained by  Christian0 and Eichenbaum (1992) and Hansen and Wright (1992) in 
models without money  or distorting taxes. These results are encouraging because they  suggest that 
monetary real business cycle models can be extended into new areas, such as policy analysis or perhaps 
even forecasting, without sacrificing a reasonable description of  the aggregate economy. 
391n the  United States, the upward trend  in <,  is possibly linked to the trend in  p, by the phenomenon of "bracket creep," which 
existed before tax  schedules were indexed for inflation  in  1985. Regarding the capital  tax T~ Auerbach and  Poterba  (1988) argue 
that  the downward trend is due to  increasingly generous investment tax credits and  accelerated depreciation schedules. 
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Standard Deviation in Percent 
Series  U.S.  Economy"  Modelb  Cooley-Hansenc 
Output  1.74  1.74  1.73 
Consumption  0.81  0.61  0.62 
Investment  8.45  5.79  5.69 
Capital Stock  0.38  0.49  0.48 
Hours Worked  1.41  1.24  1.33 
Productivity  0.89  0.64  0.50 
Price Level  (CPI)  1.59 
(GNP)  0.98 
Series 
Contemporaneous Correlation with Output 
U.S.  Economy  Model  Cooley-Hansen 
-- 
Consumption 
Investment  0.91 
Capital Stock  0.28 
Hours Worked  0.86 
Productivity  0.59 
Price Level  (CPI)  -0.48 
(GNP)  -0.53 
a~he  U.S.  statistics are from table 1 of  Cooley and  Hansen  (1989) for the period  1955:IlIQ to  1984.IQ (115 quarters). 
b~odel  statistics are mean values over 100 simulations, each 115 quarters in length. All variables were logged and detrended 
using  :he  Hodrick-Presc~tt  f&cr with  a smoothing parameter of  1600. The value 0,=0.0077  was used  for the technologj shock to 
achieve a standard deviation of  output equal to  1.74. Productivity is defined as output/hours. 
'statistics  are from Cooley and Hansen (1989), table 1, with  quarterly money growth of  0.015 and  0,=0.00721. 
Table 7:  Comparison of Labor Market Statistics 
Statistic  U.S.  Economya  Modelb  Christiano-Eichenbaumc  Hansen-Wright" 
?he  U.S.  statistics are from Hansen and Wright (1992), table 2, for the period  1947:IQ to  1991:mQ (179 quarters). The 
top and bottom numbers refer to the household and establishment surveys, respectively. 
b~odel  statistics are means over 100 simulations, each 179 quarters in  length, with  0,=0.007. 
'~hristiano and Eichenbaum (1992), table 4, with government consumption, indivisible labor, and 0,=0.012. 
d~ansen  and  Wright (1992), table 3, with home production and 0,=0.007. 
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The goal of any quantitative model of the economy should be to capture the basic incentives and 
interactions among agents that govern the process of interest. In the case of government policy, it is clear 
that  real-world  policymakers  are  fundamentally  concerned with  distribution  issues. Monetary  real 
business  cycle  models  have  been  reasonably  successful  in  describing  the  behavior  of  aggregate 
fluctuations. This paper uses such a framework as the starting point for endogenizing the choice of fiscal 
and monetary policy over time in a model with the following characteristics: 1) the distribution of wealth 
and income among households is highly skewed, 2) income inequality affects tax and spending policies, 
and 3) the government must provide transfers to the poor. 
I subjected the model to comparisons with postwar U.S.  data on tax rates, money growth, and 
inflation, and obtained varying degrees of success in capturing observed behavior of  the various time 
series. Comparisons with the data are difficult, however, because estimates of average marginal tax rates 
are available only at annual frequency and consist of  a small number of observations. A noteworthy 
result is that  the  model  predicts distinctly different behavior  for  the  labor  tax  and  the capital tax 
regarding the optimal interaction with inflation, thereby pointing out the importance of  distinguishing 
between these taxes in empirical tests for optimal government behavior. Finally, the model was shown 
to deliver business cycle statistics very dose to models in which government policy is treated  as  an 
exogenous state variable. 
The methodology of this paper can be used to perform quantitative studies in other important 
policy areas, such as characterizing the optimal behavior of  public investment over the business cycle 
or quantifying the effects of  international policy coordination on  aggregate fluctuations. Regarding 
monetary policy, a more complete description of the banking sector (which captures the liquidity effect 
of  a money shock) would be desirable. It would also be interesting to perform the policy simulations 
done here in the context of  an overlapping-generations framework (see Rios-Rull [1992]) to allow for 
age heterogeneity as  well as  for rich and poor households. For example, such a model would allow 
consideration of optimal Social Security policy (see ~mrohoro~lu,  ~mrohoroglu,  and Joines [1992]). 
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Equilibrium with Different Discount Factors 
This appendix briefly explains how the assumption of  different discount factors, pP<pR,  results 
in concentrated ownership of  capital in the hands of  the more patient, rich  households. See Becker 
(1980) for a formal treatment of  equilibrium when households have  different discount factors. The 
argument here is based on Woodford (1988). If we assume that all households face the same after-tax 
interest rate, the following condition must hold if  poor households would rather borrow than save: 
The condition for rich households to save is 
In steady state, these two conditions become 
Combining the expressions in A.3  yields the condition pPcpR  for concentrated ownership of 
capital. It should be pointed out, however, that equations A.l  and A.2  can be satisfied even if pP=pR. 
An example is when the poor face a lower after-tax interest rate than the rich. This situation might arise 
if the poor incur some type of transacti'on cost for investing small amounts that effectively reduces their 
rate of  return. Judd (1985) uses an argument similar to this to justify concentrated ownership of capital 
when all households have the same discount factor. 
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